

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, recently there has been a spate of erroneous news articles and editorials relative to the relationship of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to the Central Intelligence Agency. Ordinarily, I do not like to discuss in the Senate the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency or its relationship with the Armed Services Committee. Discussion of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency affects sources of information that are available to the CIA. In the very nature of things, these sources of information are very sensitive and easily disturbed. For that reason, I have not discussed this subject, despite the fact that some of our most eminent newspapers have made completely erroneous charges that were meant to mislead and deceive Members of Congress who are not familiar with the operations of the committees with regard to the Central Intelligence Agency.

There is a general rule, Mr. President, that the legislative oversight of any agency of Government is vested in the committee that reports the legislation that creates that Agency. Let me point out here and now that the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency were created by the Na-

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*Pers. Russell, Rich.*  
*Pers. Morse, Wayne*  
*Pers. Zensche, Frank*  
*Pers. Holland, Spenser*  
*Pers. Settonstall, Lovett*  
*Pers. Young, Milton*  
*Pers. Steanis, John*  
*Pers. Fulbright, J.W.*  
*Pers. Symington, Stuart*  
*Pers. Gruening, Ernest*  
*Pers. Gore, Albert*  
*Pers. McCarthy, Eugene*

tional Security Act of 1947. That legislation was considered only by the Committee on Armed Services, insofar as the Senate is concerned.

Therefore, unless the committee of which I am chairman has been derelict in its duty, there is no justification whatever for any other committee "muscling in" on the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee, insofar as it pertains to the Central Intelligence Agency.

As for the Appropriations Committee, a group appointed from the Department of Defense subcommittee has oversight over the Central Intelligence Agency. Every Member of the Senate, of course, knows that the appropriations for this Agency are not identified by line item for each activity. If that were done, it could destroy the usefulness of the Central Intelligence Agency and could have fatal results. Appropriations for CIA functions are included in other appropriations bills, without separate identification.

It happens that there was a duplication in the senior members of the Armed Services Committee and the senior members of the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations of the Committee on Appropriations. For example, the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], and I are members of both the Armed Services Committee and of the Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Department of Defense. It is perhaps unusual, but as a matter of convenience for some of the members of the subcommittee, the subcommittee from Defense Appropriations and the subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services have met jointly in our examinations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

At the express request of the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN] I have presided over those two subcommittees for the past several years.

Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency occupies a very peculiar position in our scheme of things. A great many charges have been made over the years against the CIA. But regardless of the nature of the charges, the CIA is not in a position to answer them. It is compelled to stand mute. It matters not the nature of the charge; and heaven knows that enough charges have been heaped upon them over the past several years.

It has been charged repeatedly that the CIA makes foreign policy and that it takes over foreign policy. That is asserted as one of the grounds of justification for the demand that the Foreign Relations Committee be permitted to share supervision over the Agency. There simply is not a scintilla of truth in that charge, and not a single concrete case can be brought to the attention of the Senate in which the CIA has undertaken to fix or to make foreign policy. It cannot possibly do so, from the very nature of its structure. Under the Constitution, the President of the United States is responsible for the conduct of the Nation's foreign policy and he operates in this area through the Secretary of State.

The CIA functions under the National Security Council. That Council is com-

posed of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning. The CIA is not authorized to initiate any kind of activity anywhere in the world, unless such activity has been ordered by the National Security Council, which is the overseer within the executive branch for the Central Intelligence Agency.

As a result, the Secretary of State is privy to all that the Agency undertakes to do.

In addition, during the administration of the late lamented President John F. Kennedy, an Executive order was issued to all our ambassadors stating that they had control of the activities of all Federal agencies within the country to which they were accredited. Accompanying the open text in the Federal Register went a private note to each ambassador, stating that this order also relates to the CIA. Therefore, the ambassador to each country has control over the operations of the CIA within that country, and he has a right to halt them or to direct them as he may see fit. So it is sheer poppycock to say that the CIA is making its own foreign policy.

Mr. President, these charges have gone so far that an editorial, which I have in my hand, published in the New York Times, refers to "Senator RUSSELL and his secret seven," and charges that the Senate subcommittee is selected with CIA screening from the Armed Services and Appropriations Committee.

There is not the slightest bit of substance to that charge. The CIA has no more to do with selecting the members of this subcommittee than the Armed Services Committee has to do with selecting the editorial staff of the New York Times—not a particle more. We have followed all the rules of seniority very rigidly in both the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations and the Armed Services Committee in selecting those who would exercise this oversight.

Some of the press insists that the Agency has congressional immunity. This editorial is headed "Congressional Immunity." Mr. President, I am familiar with the extent of legislative oversight exercised by committee. I have been a member of the Appropriations Committee for more than 30 years, and I know something about the oversight performed by the Appropriations Committee.

The CIA undoubtedly spends more time with its legislative oversight committee than does any other Government agency of which I have any knowledge.

The subcommittees have frequent meetings, and we undertake to keep abreast, as best we can, with the operations of the CIA and with its budgetary matters. These subjects are handled before two subcommittees composed of four Democrats and three Republicans. The subcommittees meet jointly for the purposes of convenience.

Mr. President, I am exceedingly proud that there has never been a security leak of any of the testimony that has come before the subcommittees. Every Senator knows something about the efforts that are exerted to get Members of Congress to give information, particularly

information that has been received in executive session.

Confidential information passes through some committees as if they were sieves. When some committees meet in executive session, from the time the door is opened the information is in the hands of the press. I am very proud of the fact that there has never been a harmful leak out of these subcommittees in all of the years since the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, the subcommittee of which the senior Senator from Georgia is now speaking has distinguished itself for the fact that there have not been any leaks. The Committee on Foreign Relations has also distinguished itself for the frequency of leaks that come out of their hearings.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator from Ohio is a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations and I have read articles that were written as a result of information that came out of executive sessions of that committee that had to do with some of his actions. I can understand how he might feel about it.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. Is it not true that another very important matter over which the Committee on Armed Services has jurisdiction concerns the matter of confirmation of the nomination of the head of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator is correct. However, that is handled before the entire Armed Services Committee.

Mr. HOLLAND. It is an Armed Services Committee jurisdiction.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator is correct. We have legislative oversight and it has never been challenged, despite the fact that others wish to "horn in" on the committee. The legislative oversight is vested in the Armed Services Committee under the rules, and that cannot be controverted. It is as established as any action or tradition or operation of the Senate could possibly be, that the legislative oversight is vested in the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. HOLLAND. Is it not also true that, in addition to having jurisdiction over the confirmation of the nomination of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Committee on Armed Services also has jurisdiction over the confirmation of the nomination of the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and is regularly exercising that function?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator is correct. That is within our domain.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thought it well for the Record to show that the complete exercise of jurisdiction is shown to be in the Committee on Armed Services as a whole or in the Legislative Oversight Committee that was set up on an informal basis, as the Senator has discussed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to continue for an additional 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Georgia is recognized for an additional 5 minutes.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I will not be able to yield to other Senators because of the limited time.

I think that one of the principal reasons why there is such a great clamor among some segments of the press to open the doors of this committee is the fact that we have been able to keep secret the matters that we have discussed and examined from time to time.

There is undoubtedly a segment of the press in this country that feels that it, and it alone, can properly direct the Government of the United States. That segment of the press has not been able to get any information from the subcommittees so that it might tell us exactly how to run the country. That segment actually does exercise a great deal more influence over the Government of the country than the average citizen suspects or recognizes. It has kept the pressures going to break into these subcommittees and to asperse their actions, when the critics have no knowledge whatever on which to predicate the charges that they make.

Mr. President, there is, of course, some connection between the operations of nearly every committee in the Senate. The Committee on Foreign Relations contends that the CIA has something to do with foreign policy. I could state with all the more assurance and justification that the actions of the Committee on Foreign Relations affect the work of the Committee on Armed Services. The size and composition of our Armed Forces are largely determined by our foreign relations. If that is a valid argument the Committee on Armed Services should have representation on the Committee on Foreign Relations.

There is some degree of relationship between almost every committee of the Senate, and for that reason the Senate rules and practices vest oversight responsibility in the committees exercising legislative jurisdiction.

The resolution being considered by the Committee on Foreign Relations seeks not only to cover the CIA, but also to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which I would assume is under the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary under the rules that we have observed heretofore.

Mr. President, the subcommittees do not operate merely to satisfy the curiosity of Senators about what the Central Intelligence Agency might be doing all over the world. No subcommittee should be created to satisfy curiosity or to disseminate information on what the Central Intelligence Agency is doing.

Think for a moment of the effect this would have on the sources of information that have been opened up painstakingly over a period of years all over the world so that information may be furnished to the executive branch of our Government, to enable the Commander in Chief to

know what military or diplomatic response to make to the manifold problems that continually arise all over the world.

As I mentioned earlier, even the fact that the subject is discussed on the floor of the Senate has a tendency to chill these sources of information. Some of these sources might be in the city of Washington. The very discussion of the subject might cause them to close up like a clam for fear that something might happen that would cause a leak that would identify them and cause them to lose their positions or, worse than that, to lose their lives.

Mr. President, the same thing is true with respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation over the years has gone to a tremendous amount of effort to open up sources of information—call it counterintelligence, if you will—concerning what our enemies are doing in this country in the area of gathering information. And our enemies do not have the difficulties that we have with leaks that come not only from Congress but also from the executive branch of the Government.

Information concerning most of what we are doing can be obtained from the magazines and the newspapers.

However, securing intelligence information is an entirely different problem for us. It is a matter of extreme difficulty. If we were to let word go abroad that a large group of Congressmen is going abroad on a matter dealing with the Central Intelligence Agency or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it would close up many sources of information those agencies have and would nullify the very considerable sums of money that it has cost us to keep those agencies in operation.

As a member of the Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee and of the Appropriations Subcommittee that has this duty, I am not in a position to evaluate my own services.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to continue for 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized for 1 additional minute.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I can only say that I have worked earnestly and conscientiously, and I have had associated with me some of the finest Members of the Senate. I do not think that these subcommittees need to apologize to anyone for the efforts they have made to carry out the duties imposed upon them by the Legislative Reorganization Act.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I received unanimous consent, I believe, to proceed for 3 or 4 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. For 5 additional minutes. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized for 8 minutes.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I shall finish well within that time.

Mr. President, I rise to support the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, my very conscientious and thorough-going chairman of that committee,

where we have served together over the past 20 years.

The CIA, we should remember, is an important effort in the security of our country. That is what it was established for. It is essential for the President to have the sort of information which it supplies, have it quietly, and have it from every source that he can get it, in order to make intelligent decisions.

The Senator from Georgia has emphasized that the CIA does not formulate policy. I cannot state that too strongly. It gathers the information on the basis of which the National Security Council does make policy.

The CIA is an outgrowth of the OSS of World War II. It was established in the Unification Act of 1947. I happen to know that because, in the end, I was the acting chairman of the conference committee that shaped that act.

Then in 1949, Congress passed a special act with relation to the CIA, to enable it to carry out its work effectively within our Constitution and our laws.

Now, certainly the CIA has never had anything to do with who served on the subcommittee. As the chairman of the committee has so well said, membership has been entirely by seniority. I first served on the Armed Services Subcommittee along with the late Senator Bridges of New Hampshire.

Under the terms of the Reorganization Act, which reformed the Senate's committee structure, this CIA effort is a part of the Armed Services Committee responsibility. Certainly we do not wish to interfere with the Committee on Foreign Relations, and they do not necessarily wish to interfere with us. What we wish to do is to act in the best interests for the security of our country, and that is what I wish to emphasize in the few minutes I have.

As the Senator has said, the ambassadors, by an order of the late President Kennedy which has since been continued, have the opportunity to supervise the work of the CIA. When I traveled abroad in 1957, I had the opportunity to have the CIA men in every city that we visited discuss their problems with me. I was much impressed by the quality of those men. In each instance, I discussed the questions with the ambassador.

Something the Senator has not pointed out, and that I might add to this discussion, is that under President Eisenhower, first, there was established what he called an intelligence consulting group. That was headed by President James Killian of MIT. When he became ill and for physical reasons could not continue that work, Mr. Clark Clifford assumed the chairmanship of that group. It has been continued under President Kennedy and President Johnson.

President Kennedy, after the Bay of Pigs, called together this group and asked them to do four things: first, to look into our foreign operations and intelligence; second, to recommend changes; third, to be a continuing body to advise him; and fourth, to be familiar with the CIA and all its activities.

I know that that group is composed of very substantial citizens, in the fullest sense of that term. I inquired just this

morning as to their personalities. We all know Mr. Clifford, the chairman. There are two leading scientists on the group: Dr. Baker and Dr. Land of the photographic organization.

The military is represented by Gen. Maxwell Taylor, for whom we all have a very high regard, and Admiral Sides. The State Department is represented by the very distinguished former Assistant Secretary and Ambassador, Robert Murphy. There is no man in whom I would have more confidence on this sort of question.

In addition, there are Gordon Gray, a former Assistant Secretary of the Army, Professor Langer of Harvard, who was in the OSS and has always had a special competence in intelligence activities, and Frank Pace, the former Budget Director and Secretary of the Army.

I emphasize this, because the group serves as a consulting committee directly responsible to the President of the United States. What we should wish to do in this body, as I see it, is to help the President, who must make decisions regarding our national security in all parts of the world today, in every possible way we can. We can help him best if we do it quietly, if we follow the activities of the CIA in every way that we believe is helpful, and give it sufficient funds to do its work.

As the chairman says, if we make public these matters in passing upon appropriations, if we publish the questions that we ask the chairman, then the CIA loses much of its value to the President of the United States.

Speaking personally, as a member of these subcommittees, I have had Mr. Allen Dulles come to my house, and I have gone to his house, in the evenings, so we could have a quiet discussion. I have done the same with Mr. McCone. Admiral Raborn has been in my house a number of times.

Last Friday afternoon, I spent a great part of the afternoon going through the CIA building and seeing with my own eyes how some of their activities were being conducted.

Under the leadership of our chairman, the Senator from Georgia, every member of that group has the opportunity to ask all the questions he wishes. The CIA gives us the subjects of concern around the world today, as it does the Foreign Relations Committee when they ask, and then we go into every question that we believe is of value for us to have knowledge of in order to discharge our legislative responsibilities.

Deliberately we publish no transcripts as the Senator has said, because of the security questions involved. We have the very able chief of staff of the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Darden, present with us at all meetings, and he keeps the continuity for us. But he takes no notes and we take no notes. Any notes that I take for the purpose of asking questions, I tear up when we leave.

That is the way we have conducted our work, and we have done it thoroughly—in my opinion as thoroughly as we can—and have kept it as quiet as we can. We have done so, as I have said before, in an effort to maintain the security of our country, and the ability of our Presi-

dent to function effectively. I do not care whether he is a Democrat or Republican, as the leader of our country, he must establish the policies.

This is not an instance of congressional interference with the President; it is congressional assistance to the President and his Security Council in building up the defense agencies and the defense of our country.

Mr. President, perhaps I am prejudiced, but I believe we have been trying to do our job; and I think and I hope that the supervision of the Armed Services Committee on security matters is left where it belongs, in that committee.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, are we in the morning hour?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYNINGS in the chair). We are now in the morning hour.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think the subject matter here has been well covered by the gentlemen who have spoken, but merely for emphasis on some of the points they have made, I wish to say this:

First, if we are to have a general debate here now on the Senate floor, or in the committee rooms, either, on the CIA, I think it is comparable to the situation going on in Vietnam, where we are over there fighting their battles, or helping them fight, and they are carrying on another war among themselves to the rear.

I believe it is beyond the capacity of our form of government to have an effective CIA, if it is to be regarded as just an ordinary agency and to be treated as such. I further believe that with our present arrangement already outlined, with the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] as the chairman of this small committee, with the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] and the other Members, excepting myself, we have the very finest plan that the Senate could have for handling a serious, delicate, highly sensitive and highly important matter of the most complicated nature.

I am pleased that the Senator from Georgia has brought this matter to the attention of the Senate this morning. He has been the most discreet, the most careful, and the most discerning Member we have, I believe, in the handling of this highly important matter. There have been statements in the press and elsewhere talking about the committee membership being screened by the CIA. Such charges are ridiculous.

We know the Senator from Georgia has served us in many ways in an outstanding manner; but I have never seen him shine quite as brilliantly, or do any job in quite as fine a manner than he has done, year after year, in this highly significant assignment. We had better leave it alone.

He has had the deepest concern. He has given the most rigid attention and the closest scrutiny and screening to money activities and to all other phases of it.

I can tell the Senate that the money the CIA has obtained has to be justified, fully justified. This is always true when the Senator from Georgia is concerned. Whatever money is gotten from him is

fully earned. He is not tight with his own personal funds, but he is tight with public funds money in the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee; and he knows what he is doing.

I wish to mention another matter. The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Young] is a man of few words but intense activity. I wish to mention him especially. Last year it fell my duty for a short time to be the acting chairman of this group. I have never had finer and more effective help than the help received from the Senator from North Dakota.

He works on these CIA matters year after year and makes a fine contribution thereto.

I trust and believe the Senate will leave this delicate and sensitive matter where it presently rests and not indulge in an extensive debate thereon; to do so would be to destroy the usefulness of the Agency that is doing a fine job.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I rise to support the position taken by the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] with respect to the handling of CIA appropriations and reports.

This is a most difficult assignment, handled, as chairman of a special committee, by one of the most able Members of the Senate, who has been on the Committee on Appropriations for more than 30 years, and who has made an intense study of military affairs, as well as other problems related to our national security.

I also support the position of the distinguished Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] who was the former Secretary of the Air Force, who has concerned himself with problems of this nature for years. Also the chairman of the Committee on Defense Preparedness [Mr. STENNIS] and others in support of present handling of CIA matters.

I play a minor role in this committee but I do appreciate the comments of the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS].

This is a difficult assignment and sometimes I wish I were not on it. One could speak more freely on some subjects if he was not on this committee because far too often people interpret what a Senator on this committee says as coming from the CIA, which is not the case. One has to be very careful what he says on almost any subject involving foreign affairs where the CIA might be involved.

A year ago last fall I took a trip around the world. Everywhere I traveled, every CIA agent was given instructions by Mr. McCone, then the head of the CIA, to give me a full report on CIA operations and to answer all questions. In all the countries I visited I met usually with the head of the CIA and the ambassador together. I found close cooperation between the two in every country. The ambassadors knew what the CIA was doing, and they operated under the instructions of the ambassador.

I can see no need whatever for the Committee on Foreign Relations having some of its members on a special committee looking into the operation of the

CIA. In fact, they could well establish a subcommittee of their standing committee to handle CIA matters alone.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. A short time ago, when this matter first came up, after the introduction of the original McCarthy resolution calling for an investigation, we had Admiral Raborn in committee. He takes the position that he is not authorized under existing regulations or law to answer questions put to him by the Committee on Foreign Relations, other than very superficial ones. However, the original McCarthy resolution, Senate Resolution 210, is not what is currently under consideration in the Committee on Foreign Relations. All that the resolution now being considered would do—on which we intend to have a vote tomorrow—would be to formalize the committee as it is now constituted and to add to it three members from the Committee on Foreign Relations. This resolution does not call for an investigation. It is only to add three members to the present membership, thus giving three committee representation. It is quite simple.

Statements have been made here indicating there might be a misunderstanding as to the nature of the resolution now under consideration by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 3 minutes of the Senator have expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for an additional 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wanted to make that clear.

I believe the Foreign Relations Committee should be represented because under existing regulations, Admiral Raborn feels he is not authorized to answer questions put to him by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

In addition, I believe that the growth of the CIA is such that it is not an anomalous situation for the Senate to have its Foreign Relations Committee represented.

All this resolution would do, if agreed to by the committee, is to have this issue submitted to the Senate, and the Senate could do what it pleases. There is nothing in this action to reflect on the senior Senator from Georgia. We all have the greatest respect and affection for him. That is quite irrelevant to what is considered here, and that is the foreign relations implications of the activities of the CIA.

It is revealing no secret that the CIA operation abroad is very great.

Foreign relations are not, of course, involved in many ways, as we were not involved when the original CIA was created. I agree with the Senator from North Dakota that the CIA has operations which are more extensive than the State Department's. They have far larger budgets and far more personnel operating in these countries. There is no idea at all on my part, or on the part

of any member of the Foreign Relations Committee, to reflect upon the Senator from Georgia or any member of the existing committee. This resolution is merely an assertion of what we believe to be one of the duties of the Foreign Relations Committee, to be aware of the developments and activities of our Government in respect to foreign relations. We are not asserting that the CIA makes foreign policy. We do assert that they greatly influence foreign policy. This is not new at all. There have been a great many times when resolutions have been introduced in this body—and I believe in the other body—seeking to create special, joint committees, or some other kind of committee to oversee CIA. This is not any new idea at all.

My thought is that it would be helpful to the CIA, and to the existing committee, if this matter in some way could be regularized by action of the Senate. The Senate has never taken any specific action creating the existing committee, nor has it ever taken any action whatever directly with regard to the CIA that I am aware of. We do not take any action on its budget, and so forth. Thus, I believe that it would clarify the situation and be beneficial to the CIA to regularize its relationship to the Senate. I do not believe it would cause all this harm.

I can see why everyone is suspicious, perhaps, of every other Member of the Senate when it comes to leaks. They are afraid someone else did it. But this resolution provides for only three new members. I believe that the members of the Foreign Relations Committee are responsible Members of the Senate.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. First, I should like to say I believe that the Foreign Relations Committee could have accomplished that purpose by establishing a subcommittee of its own to authorize and get all the information it wanted, but I believe—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. How do they do that?

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Let me answer the question. If the President of the United States would limit the CIA, as other agencies of the President are, as to the information they can divulge, I do not see that the Foreign Relations Committee would get any more information if they were part of our committee, or operating separately.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Senator, if I may respond, I asked the admiral some questions he would not answer to the Foreign Relations Committee. Then I asked; "Do you answer this kind of question to the advisory committee?" And he said, "Certainly." The advisory committee, I believe, has eight private citizens on it who are not officials of the Government in the same sense, I believe, that a Senator is. While I do not wish to puff up the importance of Senators too much, I do believe that as elected representatives they are as much entitled to information about this activity as are these private citizens who come from the business life of the Nation and also from the ranks of retired generals or semiretired generals.

Admiral Raborn said, in answering, that he would give the information to these people but not to the Foreign Relations Committee. He draws a clear distinction between the Foreign Relations Committee on the one hand and on the other the informal committee and the advisory committee. We went through all this before we offered the resolution.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I believe it is of great importance to keep this committee small. In fact, personally, I would not serve on a committee of 15 members or more, or even—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is nine.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Or even nine members or more, because—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from North Dakota has expired.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Because there is always the chance of leaks. The Senator from Georgia pointed out that this committee never has had a leak. I trust every Member of the Senate, but I would not want to serve on a sizable committee dealing with top-secret questions.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator from Arkansas referred to the informal committee. Let me say that these subcommittees are as formal as any in the Senate. When a committee is created, it is authorized to appoint subcommittees. That is exactly what we have done. There is nothing informal about this. These are formal subcommittees appointed under authority of the committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Let me ask, has there been any precedent? Was there any other example of this kind that the Senator knows of which a subcommittee has jurisdiction or oversight over an agency which is larger than the State Department?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. If the Senator is referring to the number of employees, let me mention the Department of Agriculture. The Committee on Agriculture and Forestry has four times as many employees to supervise.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But this is, as I understand, a joint committee.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It is not any joint committee. We meet together merely for purposes of convenience, because the Senator from Massachusetts and I are members of both committees, as well as the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH], and the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS]. To avoid having to meet once here, the same members go over the same subject, or practically the same subject, the next day.

For purposes of convenience, we have convened the two subcommittees together, but both are subcommittees duly appointed, as all other subcommittees of the Senate are appointed.

Mr. President, I submit that over four-fifths of the bills of this committee are



sent to us to consider by the subcommittee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from North Dakota has expired.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I want to say one word about the budget. I understand that the Bureau of the Budget, which also supervises the CIA, considers the CIA budget to be one of the very best in Government because it details everything. The Bureau of the Budget knows more precisely how the CIA operates and spends its money than any other agency of the Government.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, to be sure that we understand the nature of this resolution—and I speak as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee who is also a member of the Armed Services Committee, as well as a member of the Subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency I read section 2 of said resolution:

It shall be the duty of the committee on intelligence operations to keep itself fully and currently informed of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State and other agencies of the Government, including but not limited to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in so far as the activities of such agencies relate to foreign intelligence or counter intelligence.

Mr. President, it would seem obvious that a committee which operated in such a broad and diversified field would have to have a staff. But reasons for not having a staff have already been presented by the distinguished Senator from Georgia.

Nevertheless, section 5 states:

The committee shall have power to employ and fix compensation of such officers, experts, and employees, as it deems necessary in the performance of its duties. The committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the various departments and agencies of the government.

Mr. President, I, too, was disturbed by an editorial on Sunday, May 8, in the New York Times, which stated:

Senator RUSSELL and his "secret seven"—a Senate subcommittee selected, with CIA screening, from the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees—

Mr. President, everyone who knows anything about this committee knows that is a misstatement. There has never been any screening of this subcommittee. After 10 years of service on the Armed Services Committee I went to the chairman of that committee and asked him if I could join the CIA subcommittee. He explained why he had rigidly held to the seniority system, in the hope that as few people as possible would know the details of the various operations of the CIA, operations which affect the security and lives of the U.S. citizens; and also many people, in other countries. There is an article in the New York Times, of Friday, May 13, which gives in some detail what went on at a hear-

ing the previous day in the Foreign Relations Committee.

It is not entirely accurate. It is my understanding executive hearings should be executive hearings, and if details of them are given the press, they should be given to all the press, not to any particular segment.

Mr. President, I have often heard the basic criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency, namely, that it is setting policy. Therefore, in November and December of last year, and January and April of this year, I visited a dozen countries and made it a point to ask two questions of our ambassadors.

First, were they entirely satisfied with the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Without exception of any kind whatever, all of them said they were so satisfied.

Second, I asked if at any time they had problems with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency setting policy; and they all assured me they did not have any such problems.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield to the able and distinguished Senator from Massachusetts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 3 minutes of the Senator have expired.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for another 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, 5 additional minutes are allotted to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I wish to ask the Senator from Missouri a question. Did any ambassador tell the Senator that the CIA was creating policy without his knowledge?

Mr. SYMINGTON. No ambassador I talked to said the CIA was creating policy.

All said they were entirely satisfied with the operations of the CIA in the country in question.

In view of these colloquies and various dialogs, I am beginning to wonder whether some people think the United States can operate without any intelligence agency of any kind, unless it is an open agency; that it is not necessary or advisable, in a democratic system, to have such an agency as the CIA. I would hope, if anyone believes that is true, they would frankly so state, because I do not see how we can operate in this world in which we live today without an agency such as that headed by Admiral Raborn and formerly by John McCone and Allen Dulles.

I recently read the Penkovsky papers. He estimated that 80 percent of the people who represent the Soviet Union belonged either to the KGB, the political intelligence branch, or the GRU, the military unit.

It is interesting to note that Penkovsky tried to make contact with British businessmen for some time before he was successful, because he could not believe that anybody from the United States or Great Britain could be in Russia on a job and not be an intelligence agent of the United States or Great Britain.

Finally, I would pay my respects to the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], who satisfied me that this kind of intelligence information was so highly sensitive it should not be given to newspapers or anybody else except on the basis of right to know; and the committee should not have a staff.

In my years in the Senate I have never seen anyone who, when assigned a task, carried it out with greater diligence, character, and ability than the senior Senator from Georgia.

I would be the first to say I agree wholeheartedly with my distinguished friend the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee that there was no intent of any kind on the part of any member of the Foreign Relations Committee to criticize Chairman RUSSELL, but I do think when people write that the committee of which he is chairman is only chosen after screening by the CIA—completely inaccurate—that at least is implied criticism.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I would like to ask the distinguished chairman of the committee a question. I share wholeheartedly the tribute which the senior Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] paid him, but I would like to pose a question, because I think it pertinent to this discussion on whether the Foreign Relations Committee should not have representation on the Senate's watchdog committee. If the CIA does not make foreign policy, it certainly helps make it decisively and irretrievably when we think of the lamentable episode of the Bay of Pigs, which it sponsored, organized, and financed. When there were grave doubts about its advisability in the White House, the CIA was defending and urging that operation, in which it had the vested interest of proving that it was right, in starting it, which was certainly a matter of foreign policy. The CIA did indeed have a profound effect on the foreign policy of the United States. As has been so carefully brought out in the historical accounts by Mr. Ted Sorenson and Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, both firsthand witnesses of how the decisions for this tragic misadventure were made, the CIA did make foreign policy in that case. The CIA certainly devised, promoted, and conducted the execution of the policies that resulted in that ghastly fiasco.

I wish the Senator from Georgia would comment on that matter.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Boiling down what the Senator has said, he says that the CIA sold the President a bill of goods that was defective; that the CIA had a plan that did not work and it convinced the President to go ahead with it.

The late President John F. Kennedy was a fine statesman, with the soul of a poet and the heart of a lion. He never backed away to escape responsibility. He took full responsibility for the complete fiasco of the Bay of Pigs. Preparations and plans for the invasion had started before President Kennedy took office. There had been a training program for Cuban refugees. Those people were getting impatient and there was a possibility of their being disbanded and the whole undertaking being abandoned.

The President consulted with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I do not think the President was completely responsible. There was confusion about the views of the Joint Chiefs. There was a series of tragic errors.

The CIA made a mistake, in my opinion, in telling the President they thought this operation had a good chance of success. My own view of it—and I did not know about the timing of it, although I did know about the training—was that no 1,500 men who ever lived or fought could be put ashore under the situation that then existed in Cuba and expect to get a foothold there. But the Joint Chiefs interlaced their views with all kinds of suggestions about support by U.S. forces. There was a carrier just out of sight, off the shores of Cuba, over the horizon. I am not too sure whether our ships were to be used as support. But the operation was hopeless, because from the beginning it was based on mistakes by many of those involved, I think including everyone who was involved, except the Senator from Arkansas. He has complained about his not being privy to CIA activities. I did not know the timing of the Bay of Pigs operation but apparently the Senator from Arkansas was informed. He advised against it. I only wish I had been consulted, because I would have strongly advised against this kind of operation if I had been. That may have been one reason why I was not consulted. My position was well known. I knew about the plans, but I did not know about the timing of it. I did not think the operation had a chance of success, unless it had active support from the United States.

But the Senator cannot blame the CIA for all that was wrong.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 3 minutes of the Senator have expired.

Mr. GRUENING. I ask the Chair for 1 minute more.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator may have 1 additional minute.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The CIA could not move 1 foot and would not move 1 foot without the approval of the President of the United States and the National Security Council; and they, in turn, thought they were relying on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is some dispute about that.

Mr. GRUENING. My point is that they do in effect make foreign policy, through their persuasiveness and presumed inside knowledge. When they can persuade two Presidents—President Eisenhower, to start with in getting the expedition started and President Kennedy, who was instinctively opposed to it to approve it reluctantly—it seems to me that they did in effect make foreign policy.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not agree with the Senator at all. I do not think they made a mistake in trying to train some of the refugees, because no one could tell what was going on in Cuba. Those men might have been valuable.

Mr. GRUENING. Why did they not know what was going on in Cuba? That was their function. That was their responsibility. They led the President to

believe that there would be a great uprising, and they misinformed the President.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is what the Senator says.

Mr. GRUENING. It is a fact, as reported by the competent historians who sat in on the whole business. How can it be disputed?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I think that was a series of tragic errors on the part of everybody involved, and I do not think it is fair to place the entire responsibility—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Alaska has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not wish to prolong the matter or discuss all its merits. It would take a long time, and it has been discussed before. I wish to put in perspective the resolution the Foreign Relations Committee has under consideration. It calls only for the addition of three members to the existing informal committee. There is no requirement that there be any staff. The committee does not need to have to have a staff, if the committee does not wish one, and they do not have to go into all of the matters, of the FBI and others, that are within the authorization of their powers.

The way matters have developed, this agency seems to have engaged in far more activities than was anticipated when it was originally created.

Recently two affairs have been mentioned in the press. I am giving away no secret, because I read about them only in the press. One was the Carver article. It is unusual for a paid full-time employee of the CIA to write articles directly on foreign relations—not only on foreign relations, but also on our specific relations in Vietnam at the moment—without any identification that he is a Government employee. It seems to me to be quite beyond the ordinary anticipated activities of a member of this agency to write without identification for a distinguished domestic journal.

I do not believe the agency was created to influence surreptitiously, in a sense, the attitude and policies—the attitude, particularly—of the people of this country.

The other affair involved Michigan State University. These are two of the most recent matters that have been revealed.

I am interested because I think these are essentially nonmilitary matters, and they are intended to operate, and do operate in a different field, one that is essentially foreign policy.

The advice of three members of the Foreign Relations Committee could help to prevent the CIA from becoming involved in this kind of activity. The strictly military activities certainly are not matters of major concern to my committee; and I do not believe that my committee attempts or will attempt to interfere with any of the military aspects.

However, I have asked the CIA questions—which I do not like to go into in the Senate—about other matters which concern me very much, as a matter of foreign policy.

This quibbling about words, as to whether the CIA influences or makes

foreign policy, is a matter I do not know how to resolve. I believe that this agency, because of its enormous size and the money it has to spend, is a major influence in our foreign policy.

This is not said in derogation. On the contrary, I compliment the CIA, because in many countries its representatives stay longer and in many ways are better prepared—they are certainly better financed and have more influence—than our Ambassadors. I have been told this on a number of occasions. In other words, it is a highly efficient organization. My remarks are not meant to be a reflection upon them. But the fact is that they are often in positions because of continuity and experience to dominate policy in particular countries.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Will the Senator name any of those countries?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not like to do so in public, because it would immediately bring up names. It is for the same reason that the Senator from Georgia does not want to discuss these things in public.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have been told—and I think it is quite natural—the employees of CIA do not have the same relationship to Congress as employees of the State Department. I have never heard of anybody seeking to be sent abroad as the head of a CIA mission because he was a major contributor to a political campaign, and I doubt whether the Senator knows of one, either. In other words, the CIA employees are professionals. I was paying them a compliment, insofar as their efficiency goes. Nevertheless, it also means they are very influential in the reporting and the making—the final making—of foreign policy. I agree that foreign policy is made, in the technical sense, by the President; that is, he determines it more than anyone else—he and the National Security Council.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If I may have more time, I shall be glad to yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I request 5 additional minutes, so that I may yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Arkansas is granted 5 additional minutes.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. It is my understanding, and I am sure it is the understanding of the Senator from Arkansas, that the Director of the CIA supplies intelligence information each day to the President and the heads of various departments. The information also is given to the State Department, the military departments, the Atomic Energy Commission, and any other agency that is concerned. So it is not the CIA alone that has this information.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is the largest and most important of the intelligence agencies. I do not view this resolution as a radical action. I shall be content with whatever the Senate wishes to do. This is the most moderate proposal that has been made to Congress in recent years, and I thought it would help to dispose

of this matter. The question did not originate with the resolution of the Senator from Minnesota. I recall that the present majority leader introduced a resolution providing for the creation of a much larger joint committee in this field, and other Senators have done the same. I considered this a modest proposal, one that would necessitate a minimum of participation by Senators outside those who are at present concerned.

No other committee of any consequence has as few as nine members. The Foreign Relations Committee has been enlarged to 19, over my protest, and that of a number of senior Senators. It started out with 13, was enlarged to 15 and then 17, and now has 19 members. I think the committee is too big. I certainly was not in favor of it. The enlargement was done, without my concurrence, during the regime of the present President of the United States. Anyway, it was done.

I grant that the more people who are included, no matter who they are, the more likely will there be leaks of information. In this instance we are only suggesting three additional members, to bring the total membership to nine. I would not say that this would result in a major, terrible, drastic, catastrophic change in the present situation. I thought it was a modest suggestion, one that might quiet the whole matter down and satisfy those who violently object, for example, to incidents like the Carver article or the MSU incident. I do not want to call the roll on others.

There have been other instances, and I do not want to dwell upon a mistake. Everybody makes mistakes. I want to keep to this point and to some of the other points that have been made. I do not understand why this proposal is taken so seriously and is considered a major uprooting of the established procedure. I do not believe that the members of the Foreign Relations Committee are any more prone to leak information than anyone else.

I do not consider as leaks some of the matters that have been referred to this morning as leaks.

For example, a complaint was made this morning in the committee about the votes in executive session.

During the tenures of Senators Connally and George as chairmen, when there were votes in executive session on specific bills, they tried not to divulge to the newspapers the results of the voting. But the reporters bedeviled everybody with the question, "How did you vote?" As a matter of convenience to the members, so far as the vote was concerned, my predecessors as chairman gave the information to the newspaper reporters. It was actually a convenience. This is one of the things that was called a leak this morning. It is not a leak. It is an old custom that information as to the votes be given when there is a specific vote, as was taken on the resolution which is under consideration by the committee as a whole. If a quorum is developed—I do not know whether it will be—the committee will vote on the proposal tomorrow morning.

Even then it is up to the Senate to do what it likes with the proposal. The committee sincerely believes that this proposal would contribute to the quieting of the quickening criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency. It might even contribute some suggestions as to how the agency might operate. That is all the proposal is. I think it is a very modest proposal. I am not fighting over it. If the Senate does not want to do this, it is all right with me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, at the time that I questioned whether I be a member of the committee some 4 or 5 years ago, the Senate from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] said I could go to the Central Intelligence Agency at any time and get any information desired. In that way it was limited to one person.

I feel sure that, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, if the distinguished Senator from Arkansas wanted to get any information personally, he would be assured he could obtain that information.

I would not want the Record to reflect there is any information that the able Senator could not obtain. It is effort to control the number of people, perhaps, especially staff people, who have access to such highly sensitive information.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it is a matter of principle that the Committee on Foreign Relations is entitled to this information. I am not complaining about the matter personally. I related this in the committee meeting. I asked certain questions which I think are quite legitimate. The questions did not involve certain delicate matters such as the budget which he might not want to answer even to the committee.

I feel that the admiral is under great restrictions as to our committee, and he may be correct. It is a big committee. As everyone knows, it is too big a committee, but I cannot help that.

The proposal of the Senator from Minnesota is to have three Senators from Foreign Relations on a select committee. That would be very different from giving the whole committee security information on the CIA.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Does the Senator feel any member of the Committee on Foreign Relations who wanted specific information on the basis of "right to know," would be denied that information?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know about that. I can only relate what actually happened. I do not know whether anyone has made such an effort.

I do not see that this is so important or that it involves so much. Our country is involved in so many different countries around the world that it is more than appropriate that the Committee on Foreign Relations have representation in this very unusual operation.

There is no denying that the CIA in numbers—and I might think in quality, although I do not know that except in a few instances about which I have been

told—is larger than the State Department.

I do not know that we can say that the State Department makes policy. It merely advises the President, and it has more or less influence.

I do think that this great prominence of the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign policy probably grew up by pure chance when the Secretary of State and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency were brothers. That created a relationship that was rather unusual in our system. As a result of this relationship, there grew up the idea that perhaps the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency were more intimately associated with the making of foreign policy than the original creation of the Agency anticipated. That situation existed for the 7 or 8 years, or whatever period of time it was, that John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State.

I think this is a restricted proposal and I hope that the Senate will accept it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, in view of the remarks that have been made by sundry Senators today, I feel that I should make some brief comment.

Both as a member of the House Appropriations Committee for 10 years and as a Senator, in my personal relations with the Central Intelligence Agency and its Directors have been good.

I have heard the chairman of the committee make inquiries of the Director in recent weeks, to which inquiries the Director did not answer. I have not personally made an inquiry of the CIA which has not been satisfied.

As chairman of the African Subcommittee, during the critical situation in the Congo I was currently informed. I was in the Congo. I had close communication with the CIA agents and personnel there. I should like to say that the operation in the Congo was one of the successful undertakings of our Government in this decade. It saved the heart of Africa from a deliberate, attempted seizure by the Soviet Union. So, when I make the comments which I expect to make, I wish them to be understood in the light of my own close working relationship with the CIA on critical occasions and my very good and satisfactory relations with them.

I want to make another thing perfectly clear. I hold the senior Senator from Georgia in the highest esteem and affection. That question is not involved here at all.

The question really before the Senate, or the question that will soon be before the Senate, I hope, is whether the CIA and its program and its operations have sufficient implications on foreign policy to justify the Senate in placing three members of the Senate Foreign Relations committee on a select committee to exercise surveillance over the CIA.



In my view the case is overwhelmingly persuasive. Unquestionably the Appropriations Committee should have a member on the surveillance committee. I think that unquestionably the Armed Services Committee should have representation on that surveillance committee.

It would seem to me, as between the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services, that perhaps the Committee on Appropriations would have priority. But, as between the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, I should be hardpressed to say to which committee the choice should be given, if a choice were to be made between those two committees.

I should be a little inclined to think, in view of the current and recent operations of the CIA, that priority should be given to the Committee on Foreign Relations. However, I think that all three of the committees that I have mentioned should be represented on the surveillance subcommittee. That is the reason that I propose to vote for the resolution.

The distinguished senior Senator from Georgia spoke of there being no necessity to satisfy the curiosity of Senators. I think that upon reflection he would think that there is a need to satisfy the inquiries and the concern of Senators.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I did not say inquiries and concern.

Mr. GORE. The Senator said curiosity.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator is correct.

Mr. GORE. I should think the Senator from Georgia would think, upon reflection, that there is a need to satisfy the curiosity of Senators on a matter affecting war or peace, on a matter affecting the relationship of the United States and that of other foreign countries.

I think Senators are entitled to have their curiosity satisfied under such circumstances. However, I have had very satisfactory experience with the CIA and with the present Director when I talked to him last at a committee hearing.

#### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Tennessee be permitted to continue for an additional 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The hour of 2 o'clock having arrived, the Senator does not need unanimous consent to proceed.

Mr. GORE. I shall not use very much time.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, does the rule of germaneness apply?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The rule of germaneness does apply.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the rule of germaneness be waived.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Correct. That was my intention.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon has a parliamentary inquiry. The Senator will state it.

Mr. MORSE. Now that the hour of 2 o'clock has arrived, do we automatically bring to an end the morning hour, or are we still in the morning hour?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business has been concluded at 2 o'clock.

Mr. MORSE. Then the Senator from Tennessee has the floor in his own right for whatever period of time he wishes?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee has the floor in his own right. The Senator from Georgia has requested that the rule of germaneness be waived. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the rule of germaneness is waived.

The Senator from Tennessee is recognized.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I was about to say that the last time the director of the CIA, Admiral Raborn, appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he personally came by and offered to come to my office to give me such additional information as I might wish about a question which I had expressed an interest. So in stating these views, I wish to make it explicitly clear that I do not take this position in criticism of the CIA—though in some instances I have not favored the undertaking of that agency—nor the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia.

Mr. President, the remarks of the Senator from Georgia about the Bay of Pigs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff cause me to make some comments which I have withheld for a long while. The only time I recall when I have been personally pilloried on the floor of the Senate during my service here was during the period when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was investigating the Bay of Pigs affair; and after a certain revelation, which was within my knowledge before it was generally revealed, I expressed the view that the President needed the advice of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff other than the Chairman at that time, General Lemnitzer. As sometimes happens, this expression of mine received wide circulation.

There was an immediately outcry on the floor of the Senate, by some of the generals of the Senate, that I was undermining the morale of the armed services. There was a spate of editorials from coast to coast. I was unable to defend myself with facts because the information which would have provided me a perfect defense was then classified information.

Since then, a great deal of history has been written by the people who were participants in that conference. The distinguished senior Senator from Georgia has himself made some statements on the floor today which prompt me to make this statement. He said that the

joint chiefs implied that—I will not undertake to quote him exactly, but as I understood it—that they based their opinion on air support.

Mr. President, it happened that I was the first caller on the late President Kennedy on the morning after the Bay of Pigs invasion. I shall not undertake to describe the drama of that occasion. He was a very troubled man—very disturbed about some advice he had received.

As the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia has now related, at least in part, and as others have stated, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff certified to the President that the proposed Bay of Pigs invasion was a feasible military operation without air support. It was upon the basis of the knowledge of that fact that I made the statement that the President needed the advice of a wiser and abler Chief of Staff. So I make this statement now, long after the Bay of Pigs and long after the experience I endured on the floor of the Senate then, being unable at that time to defend myself by making a statement for the Record, when all that any Senator had to do was go downstairs and read the committee record, and I invited some of them to go and so read.

Mr. President, the Senator from Alaska says that the CIA made policy with respect to the Bay of Pigs operation. I could not exactly agree with that. I would not agree that the CIA made policy in this instance or that it made policy in the Congo. But there, as in the Congo, the CIA was a very important operative. An agency that executes policy and advises as to the feasibility of policy; an agency that gathers and evaluates intelligence, that advises upon the probable results of policy, describing conditions existing which, in the view of that Agency, justify a policy, is certainly a part of decisionmaking.

I think, if the Senator from Alaska will permit me, I would suggest that instead of the CIA making policy, it engages in an important decisionmaking function, the final policy determination being, of course, vested in the President of the United States.

But this advice, this execution of policy, this examination of the situation, this description of an existing situation, this gathering and evaluation of intelligence information, is such a vital part of decisionmaking, and in many instances has such important implications on foreign policy, that it seems to me overwhelmingly to justify the presence of members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on this surveillance committee.

Therefore, Mr. President, with no intention to derogate members of the present subcommittee, or to criticize the CIA in any particular instance, I shall support the resolution.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GORE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator from Tennessee, and I commend him for having made a most objective case in behalf of the resolution proposed by the Foreign Relations Committee.

Certainly no one on that committee questions the ability, the integrity, or the dedication of the senior Senator from Georgia in his work in dealing with this Agency, nor the ability, integrity, or dedication of any of the members who have served on this very special committee. So far as I know, they have met all their responsibilities.

That is not the issue presented to the Senate. The issue is the basic one defined by the Senator from Tennessee and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright], of whether or not the Senate believes that the Foreign Relations Committee, which is the instrument of the Senate charged with responsibility for advising the Senate on foreign policy questions, should have the same kind of information which is given to selected members of the Armed Services Committee.

As the Senator has said, we do not challenge the right; it is entirely proper that the members of that committee should be given information about the Central Intelligence Agency. We do not challenge the right of the Appropriations Committee to receive such information. But I am sure the Senator agrees with me that, if we are really to fulfill our constitutional responsibility delegated to us by the Senate in foreign relations matters, at least three members of our committee should receive the same treatment accorded three members of the Armed Services Committee and three members of the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. GORE. I concur fully. The Senate, under the Constitution, has a limited sort of partnership with the President in the conduct of this Nation's relations with other countries through advice and consent to confirmation of appointees, ambassadors, Secretaries of State, to ratification of treaties, and in other ways.

This body has a quasi-partnership with the President in the conduct of international affairs. That responsibility has been partially delegated by the Senate to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

It would seem to me that in consequence, therefore, the committee would be entitled to the privy sort of relationship with this operational agency, surely to the extent of any other committee.

Mr. McCARTHY. In effect, what we are asking is that the Senate pass judgment on this proposal. It may be that they feel they have a different responsibility and that the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations are not to be trusted. If that is the case they should give thought to changing the membership of that committee so that it could carry out its responsibility.

But some Senators say, "We can trust six members of the Senate to deal with this matter, and we can trust six persons from the citizenry." We know the members of the staff of the Bureau of the Budget have to be trusted with information on the CIA. And at least six members from the House of Representatives are trusted.

Here we have Senators who should be given this information. We have a CIA

Director saying, "I can give this information to others, but not to you."

There was no offer to give the information if we went to the building on the other side of the river. He said that he thought it was clear that he did not have the right to give it to us.

What we propose to do is to make it clear that under the law the Director can give this kind of information to the members of our committee under the same conditions and terms that it is given to members of the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee.

One of the Senators cited the resolution in terms of Staff and related activities.

The chairman of the Armed Services Committee made the point that under the present arrangement there is a formal committee, a subcommittee of his committee. If that is the case, then he could use the authority he has in setting up a staff for his committee to carry on necessary activities.

If there are new procedures recommended by the Senate that are not now followed, those procedures could be followed by this proposed special committee which is in controversy here today.

Mr. GORE. I serve on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. This committee handles information of the most secret and delicate nature. It has a very competent staff. Its meeting room is subject to scrutiny by the FBI before each meeting is held. I have never known of the divulgence of any secret from that committee. I know no reason why this cannot be duplicated.

How a Senator may vote on an issue is not a secret which involves the national security. The design of a bombsight, or the techniques involved in the development of a nuclear weapon might be a secret which the enemy would welcome. But I doubt if any foreign country is very much interested in how I vote on a motion in the Committee on Foreign Relations. My constituents are interested and perhaps they are entitled to know. At least the security of the country is not involved if they do know. My own security might be at some time.

This is a matter of one sort, but a secret that is important to the security of the country is another.

I know of no information that is ever divulged from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that involves the security of the country.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GORE. I yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. I know that the interest of the Senator from Tennessee and myself and other Senators did not develop in consequence of a series of articles in magazines and newspapers, or publications and books dealing with the CIA.

That interest and concern goes back to the early fifties when the Hoover Commission reported and advised that there should be a committee to exercise continuous supervision of this kind.

At that time, it was not a question of passing judgment on any activities, but of proper procedures of the Government

of the United States. That was when interest in this matter first developed. I have followed it since. This is true of most Senators who have continued that interest through the years. It is a concern for the proper function of Government, for the maintenance of proper relationships, and it is a desire to provide procedures by which the Senate, in this case through the Committee on Foreign Relations, can exercise its basic constitutional responsibility.

Mr. GORE. I thank the Senator. Before closing, I wish—

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield before closing?

Mr. GORE. I shall yield, but now I wish to advert to the question involving General Lemnitzer. I do not now wish to criticize General Lemnitzer.

As the Senator from Georgia said, many people made an error in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. I have made my share of errors.

I do wish to set the record straight at this late date. After it was divulged that General Lemnitzer had certified to President Kennedy that the proposed Bay of Pigs invasion without air cover was a feasible military operation, I thought that the President was entitled to have, and I felt there was a great need for him to have, advice from a different Chief of Staff.

Let the record show that President Kennedy thought so, too, as demonstrated by his subsequent action in bringing Gen. Maxwell Taylor back from retirement and making him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I wish to complete the record on that point. I do not wish now to criticize anyone. I wish to say that I was unjustly criticized at the time because of the statement I made, which I think was 100 percent true then and it is 100 percent true now.

I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. I have no quarrel with, in fact, I welcome the emendation which my friend from Tennessee made with regard to my statement that the CIA does make foreign policy.

Whether the statement of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright], the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, that the CIA influences foreign policy, or whether the modification proponent by the Senator from Tennessee which I think falls between those two statements is correct, the basic fact is that the CIA exerts enough influence on foreign policy in effect to make foreign policy. This was demonstrated in the Bay of Pigs, where they organized the invasion project and when its soundness was challenged in the White House before it was launched, felt they had to defend and stay with their original purpose, which would more than justify putting three members of the Foreign Relations Committee on the watchdog committee. That was the point, I was making.

It is very clear that in the Bay of Pigs they, the CIA were major factors in making policy and had created a situation which made it almost impossible for President Kennedy to back out. Thus, in effect, they did make foreign policy.